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Redefining intelligence support in a resource 
constrained environment 
Carrick Longley 
The intelligence community must embrace technology and an 
organizational restructuring to provide more accurate, effective, and 
efficient intelligence while reducing its resource footprint. With the 
establishment of permanent intelligence fusion centers stateside, 
reporters, analysts, linguists and watch officers can focus their energy 
on training a more professional, capable force while providing 
increasingly complex and sophisticated analysis to support operators 
on the ground. 
Introduction 
 The intelligence community (IC) must embrace technology and an organizational 
restructuring to provide more accurate, effective, and efficient intelligence while reducing 
its resource footprint. The Department of Defense (DoD) faces drastic reductions in 
equipment and manning in the wake of an increasingly unstable global economic 
downturn and must reduce spending by nearly $178 billion over the next five years 
alonei.  Additionally, the recent report on intelligence in Afghanistan by Major General 
Flynnii is a stark reminder the IC isn’t doing enough to provide the right kind of 
intelligence to the war fighter.  In order to achieve both a reduction in cost and a refocus 
on providing the right kind of intelligence support, the IC must adopt radical new 
changes to become more effective and efficient while consuming fewer resources.  These 
changes include the establishment of consolidated intelligence fusion centers; a reduction 
in the number of intelligence professionals deployed to combat zones; and a leveraging of 
information systems to manage intelligence collection, processing, reporting, and 
analysis.  By adopting a reach-back model wherein consolidated intelligence fusion 
centers provide the majority of intelligence support to forward elements, the IC can 
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improve intelligence capability, reduce costs, and accomplish ‘more with less’ than the 
current model.  
The Intelligence Fusion Center of yesterday and tomorrow 
 The Marine Corps introduced the concept of the Tactical Fusion Center (TFC) 
during Operation Iraqi Freedomiii (OIF) that brought together intelligence professionals 
in a variety of disciplines under a single roof to provide the Marine Expeditionary Force 
(MEF) with all-source intelligence support.  While the capabilities of the TFC were far 
reaching, the logistics support required to maintain this large footprint was not a small 
undertaking.  Both the Marine Radio and Intelligence Battalions deployed with hundreds 
of individuals required to support their efforts - many of whom were not intelligence 
professionals themselves.  Electronic maintenance, communications, logistics, 
administration, and motor transportation were among the many supporting elements 
required to support the needs of the TFC to function overseas.  A majority of these 
individuals consumed information and material resources to support their efforts as well.  
Resource constraints and bandwidth limitations in forward outposts are often severely 
strained due to the large amount of non-essential and routine traffic pushed over the 
networks.  Reducing the number of individuals using these networks in bandwidth 
constrained environments and transferring this demand to CONUS networks can 
significantly reduce the information bottlenecks that occur today.  Additionally, a 
reduction in numbers of individuals deployed will also lead to a reduction in costs.  Once 
these forces are reduced at the forward presence, they can continue to provide support 
while operating in combined intelligence fusion centers.  Rather than deploy linguists, 
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analysts, report writers, and watch officers and the logistics burden that accompanies 
them to a large outpost in a forward environment, these same individuals will now work 
in permanent intelligence fusion centers providing the same level of intelligence 
processing, analysis, and dissemination stateside.  
 Intelligence units require a high amount of connectivity and access to network 
resources to accomplish their mission.  Information is often collected and transmitted 
using various networks and the reporting processes, tracking and sharing are all done 
using these same networks.  With the capabilities of these information systems, physical 
proximity means less now than it has before.  An interconnected network of networks has 
replaced the limitations once posed by line-of-site communication systems.  Relying on a 
constellation of satellite and terrestrial communications systems, analysts located in the 
United States can watch real-time video of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) platforms and receive field reports, as they are collected.  This information can in 
turn be processed, analyzed, and disseminated to operators in the field in a matter of 
minutes.  With this ability to transfer information quickly from the point of capture to an 
analyst and back, the need to deploy thousands of individuals to a combat zone 
occupying large outposts is unnecessary. 
 Many problems such as occupational proficiency, strained family life, and lack of 
training affect intelligence support. Nearly every one of these problems can be attributed 
to the high deployment rates for soldiers, sailors, Marines, and airmen.  While the 
majority of the operating forces experience much higher deployment to home station 
ratios, the intelligence occupational fields (at least in the Marine Corps) often experience 
ratios close to 1:1iv.  In other words, personnel are deployed as often as they are home 
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causing enormous strain on family life for these individuals.  In addition to strained 
personal lives, units have difficulty providing their individuals with adequate training 
given the limited number of days spent in CONUS. Language proficiency for linguists 
trained in languages other than those spoken in target area of operations (AOR) have 
experienced difficulties with promotion due to their inability to work on their target 
languages given the deployment cycle.  Basic intelligence analysts are often not well 
prepared to conduct meaningful analysis and often resort to the ‘sports, news, and 
weather’ presentations that merely discuss events and offer opinions as to why these 
events occurred with little empirical support for their arguments.  If we can reduce the 
number of these individuals that must deploy, it is logical to presume that our ability to 
train these individuals and retain the quality needed to solve complex problems will 
improve.  Our intelligence professionals can focus on their target environments in the 
course of their daily work and occupational proficiency will increase.  The removal of the 
pre-deployment training process will reduce the number of hours devoted to non-
intelligence focused activities.  In other words, our intelligence professionals will spend 
more time doing intelligence work and less time focusing on non-essential work. 
Analytic support from Monterey to Kandahar 
 In order to demonstrate that this model is not merely theoretical, the following 
section will discuss the implementation of an information collection tool used by 
Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams in Afghanistan during the fall of 2010 and 
the support provide by the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) lab at 
NPS in Monterey, California.  By using an inexpensive, unclassified, open-source 
information system developed at the NPS, the lab demonstrated the ability to support 
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complex, tactical operations in remote villages thousands of miles away to include 
sociocultural analysis support to forward operators using free and open-source 
technology.   
 From August to November 2010, the Field Information Support Tool (FIST) was 
employed in Afghanistan in support of the Village Stability Platform (VSP).  FIST was 
used as a means to expose operators to a more comprehensive analytic methodology for 
analyzing the complex, sociocultural environment in Afghanistan and demonstrate the 
capabilities of technology developed at the NPS.  During this prototype employment of 
FIST, the Village Stability Operations (VSO) teams collected hundreds of unique reports, 
conducted analysis on a variety of metrics, and produced a number of analytical products 
focused on the sociocultural landscape in southern Afghanistan.  In addition to their own 
organic collection and analysis, the teams used a web-based information repository to 
share their data.  The combined dataset included over 421 unique collection reports 
containing several hundred individuals, organizations, locations and relational ties 
embedded therein.  These reports were obtained using a framework specifically 
developed and tailored for the VSO mission in which the collection of relational 
information on business, kinship, organizational, personal, and tribal affiliations in 
addition to obtaining standard demographic data formed the preponderance of data 
collection.   
 Once the VSO data was collected, the CORE lab analyzed the dataset using 
geospatial, temporal, and using social network analysis in order to provide a coherent, 
logical, and useful analytic product based on empirical data while working in a laboratory 
in California.  This analysis yielded results that confirmed the understanding of the 
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operational environment forward, but also provided unique insights not previously 
discovered by the units on the ground. The following section details how this analysis 
was conducted to demonstrate the ability to conduct reach back analysis and build 
products to support even small, tactical level units. 
 
Figure 1 - Map of the Khazrek District 
Source: Afghanistan Information Management Services 
 
 The analysis of the Khazrek district begins by taking a look at the district 
geospatially (see Figure 1) and then focusing on some of the high level observations that 
can be made about the data collected in the area. During the collection, interviewers 
recorded the location of the interview, asked about the location of the individuals' home 
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and their place of work. By recording these locations geospatially, we can use tools such 
as Google Fusion Tables to quickly display the resident's location on satellite imagery in 
Khazrek.  
 
Figure 2 - Map showing the location of residents interviewed in the Khakrez District 
 After becoming oriented geospatially with the location of the district and the 
individuals interviewed (Figure 2), we continue to focus on general demographics in the 
area. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the occupations of the individuals in the district as 
a percentage of the total interviews. This table was built using the occupation data field 
collected from the VSO teams. 
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Table 1 - Occupation breakdown of Khazrek District 
 Of note, more than one third of the population held agricultural jobs suggesting 
that any efforts focused on agrarian matters would be of interest to a significant majority 
of the district.  From general demographic breakdown, we continue to look at the 
organizational structure of the district as seen in Figure 3. The red nodes correspond to 
individuals and the green blocks are organizations. While there are other organizations in 
Khazrek, isolates (nodes with no ties to the network) and dyads were removed to clean up 
the visualization. 
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Figure 3 - Khazrek District Organizations Sociogram 
 From the organizational sociogram, we focus more specifically on the tribal 
affiliation network in Khazrek. Figure 4 is the tribal affiliation sociogram and Table 2 
shows the breakdown of the dataset in terms of tribes in the area with individuals once 
again being represented by red circles and tribes by green squares. 
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Figure 4 - Tribal Affiliation Network in Khazrek 
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Table 2 - Tribal Composition in the Khazrek District 
 Now that we have looked at the Khazrek dataset with broad-brush strokes, we 
now focus more specifically on the common linkages between the two dominant tribes – 
the Popalzai and Alikozai. 
 
Figure 5 - Common Linkages between Tribes 
 The four individuals highlighted in Figure 5 (made anonymous for purposes of 
this discussion) could prove useful, as they represent the ties common between both 
tribes in the area (from the data collected). These individuals serve as bridges between 
the two tribes that could serve as a means of improving communication or cooperation 
between the groups. Conversely, focusing on the same persons and reducing or 
eliminating the ties between the groups could sever ties. As the purpose of the VSO is to 
improve the security and livelihood in the area, the former is practice of interest. 
 After focusing on the organizational level data, we turned our attention to the 
individual level networks and analyzed a combination of personal, kinship, and business 
ties. For this network, isolates and pendant nodes were recursively hidden that yielded the 
sociogram seen in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6 - Individual Level Network Analysis  
 Interestingly, the procedures performed during the analysis brought to light the 
same network of Agent 106 and his role in the Khazrek District.  The VSO team 
identified and focused their analysis on Agent 106 based on the identification from the 
detachment commander in Khazrek. In our analysis, we identified the same individual 
based on his unique position between two Mullahs and position in the network. Being 
able to identify key individuals like Agent 106 without prior knowledge of the village is 
critical in understanding and developing various strategies and lines of operation.  
 Longley: Redefining intelligence support in a resource constrained environment 
  13 
 The above analysis demonstrates that it is not only feasible to conduct reach back 
analytic support, but it also demonstrates that insights normally thought to only be 
available at the forward edge can be observed from thousands of miles away with no 
prior knowledge of the operating environment.  
Conclusion 
 Technology is readily available (in fact, a large amount of it is free to use) that can 
aid in transforming how we provide intelligence support from the strategic to the tactical 
level.  The ability to transfer large amounts of information throughout the operating 
environment enables the IC to adopt a new construct wherein support is provided 
remotely with greater consistency at a reduction in cost.  By standing up permanent 
intelligence fusion centers stateside, the ability to conduct long-term intelligence support 
will not be jeopardized by a decreasing budget and reduction of force structure.  Soldiers, 
sailors, Marines, and airmen can spend more time at home, improve occupational 
proficiency, and continue to provide the support needed for the Long War ahead.  Rather 
than exhaust our limited supply of highly specialized individuals over the next decade, 
we should instead focus on how we can maximize the output and quality of support while 
minimizing risk. 
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